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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-A-255

13 May 1983

AGENDA

Two Hundred and Sixty-third Meeting
Wednesday, 25 May 1983, 10:00 a.m.
Room 4E64, Langley Headquarters Building

Preliminary Comments ✓

ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes of 20 April meeting ✓

ITEM 2 Subcommittee reports

Computer Security ✓

Research & Development ✓

Security Awareness ✓

Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations ✓

ITEM 3 Revision of DCID 1/7 (discussion of and decision on changes to draft revision recommended by Compartmentation Subcommittee. Please see attached copy of their 10 May 1983 memorandum.)

ITEM 4 Demonstration of copy-proof paper

ITEM 5 New Business

ITEM 6 Next Meeting

Attachment

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-116

23 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee


FROM:


Chairman



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SUBJECT: Subcommittee Chairmanships

1. At the April SECOM meeting we discussed the Physical Security Working Group (PSWG). I reported that CIA was willing to nominate an experienced senior officer to serve as Chairman of that Working Group. Now they find it impossible to do so.

2. Also, effective in August, , Chairman, Personnel Security Subcommittee (PerSecSub) from NSA, must be replaced. He has been awarded a graduate fellowship for the next year and will not be able to continue serving with the Subcommittee.

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3. We scheduled our first Physical Security Seminar  for 8-12 August and the next Adjudicators' Seminar for 15-19 August. Accordingly, we have an urgent need for a Chairman now to work with the established PSWG on the first Seminar. Of course, this office will provide all possible assistance. I believe that it would be advantageous also to select a replacement for  in time to permit him to observe the August Adjudicators' Seminar as preparation for his new responsibilities.

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4. Your earliest consideration of these needs will be appreciated. Nominations for the PSWG position should be to me by 3 June, and nominations for the PerSecSub position should be in by 15 July.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-D-092

26 April 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chairman

STAT

SUBJECT: Waiver of DCID 1/7 Requirements for MITRE Corp.

- REFERENCES:
- A. My memo to Members, SECOM-D-046, dated 28 Feb. 1983, subject: DIA Request Concerning DCID 1/7 Controls
 - B. My memo to Members, SECOM-D-067, dated 18 March 1983, subject: Waiver of DCID 1/7 Requirements for Certain Contractors

1. Reference A forwarded for SECOM Member comment a DIA request for the C³I Division of the MITRE Corporation to receive NOCONTRACT and PROPIN intelligence without case-by-case originator authorization as required by DCID 1/7. Reference B advised that the SECOM Compartmentation Subcommittee would be tasked to consider amending DCID 1/7 to permit requests such as that made by DIA to be addressed on a generic instead of an ad hoc basis.

2. At their 26 April 1983 meeting, Compartmentation Subcommittee members voted not to recommend any change to DCID 1/7 to permit a broader category of contractors to be exempted from the provisions of NOCONTRACT and PROPIN controls. Accordingly, the original DIA request is before the SECOM again. It requires a decision on whether the MITRE Corporation element involved should be individually treated as though it were a "Government-owned, contractor-operated laboratory" and hence exempt from the DCID 1/7 dissemination controls on NOCONTRACT and PROPIN material.

3. Members are requested to complete the attached vote sheet, sign and date it, and return it to the Executive Secretary no later than 18 May 1983. Any division of opinion on this issue will be addressed at the 25 May SECOM meeting.

[Redacted]

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-067

18 March 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee

FROM:


Chairman

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SUBJECT: Waiver of DCID 1/7 Requirements for Certain Contractors

REFERENCES:


- A. DIA Request Concerning DCID 1/7 Control (SECOM-D-046), 28 February 1983
- B. Chairman, Compartmentation Subcommittee Memo dated 16 March 1983 (Copy Attached)

1. In reference A the Defense Intelligence Agency requested that the MITRE Corporation's C³I Division, a Federal Contract Research Center, be granted relief from DCID 1/7 rules in the same manner as government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) laboratories. In reference B, Colonel Mercurio suggests that SECOM consider general policy for waiving DCID 1/7 requirements for contractors, in order to avoid an ad hoc decision in each such case that arises.

2. Colonel Mercurio's proposal appears to be highly appropriate to the situation. Therefore, I intend to task the Compartmentation Subcommittee to formulate a proposal for appropriate policy. I plan to levy this requirement on 1 April 1983 unless the membership raises serious objections.

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Attachment





DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON DC 20330

16 MAR 1983

REPLY TO
ATTN OF

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SUBJECT DIA Request Concerning DCID 1/7 Controls (Your SECOM-D-046, 28 Feb 83)

TO Chairman
DCI Security Committee

1. Your memorandum asked for views on waiving the DCID 1/7 NOCONTRACT requirements for the C³I Division, MITRE Corporation.
2. Before taking action on this request, we suggest that the SECOM develop more definitive guidelines on requests of this nature. As you know, the original intent of DCID 1/7 was to provide relief for government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) laboratories performing classified services in support of the intelligence mission of an Intelligence Community organization.
3. The MITRE C³I Division is a Federal Contract Research Center (FCRC)--not a GOCO. To grant MITRE relief from the DCID 1/7 rules simply because of their FCRC status could well result in a number of other FCRC's asking for similar DCID 1/7 relief. If the SECOM believes that FCRC's should be eligible for DCID 1/7 relief, then the directive should be changed accordingly.
4. We recommend that waivers be considered only for GOCOs and that previous SECOM action on the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) be reconsidered in this light.

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GEORGE J. MERCURO, Colonel, USAF
Air Force Member
DCI Security Committee

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-D-046

28 February 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chairman

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SUBJECT:


DIA request concerning DCID 1/7 controls

1. Attached is a copy of a memorandum the DIA member tabled at the 23 February 1983 SECOM meeting. It requests SECOM approval for the C³I Division of the MITRE Corporation to receive NOCONTRACT and PROPIN intelligence without case-by-case originator authorization. Inquiry to DIA shows that only NOCONTRACT material is at issue; the request for PROPIN data does not need to be addressed.

2. I would appreciate your views by 21 March 1983 on the applicability of DCID 1/7 controls to the situation described in the DIA memorandum.

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Attachments



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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

22 FEB 1983

U-7575/OS-3B

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: MITRE Access

- References:
- a. OUSDRE memorandum, 4 February 1983, subject as above. (Enclosure)
 - b. DCID 1/7, "Control of Dissemination of Intelligence Information" 4 May 1981.
 - c. Agenda item for SECOM Meeting, 23 February 1983.

1. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence (DUSD C3I) has requested Director, DIA, grant authorization to the C3I Division, MITRE Corporation access to intelligence information. The DUSD C3I states the MITRE Corporation, a Federal Contract Research Center, should be accorded access to caveated intelligence marked "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS" (NOCONTRACT) (NC) and "CAUTION - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED" (PROPIN) (PR) without approval of the originator on a case-by-case basis, as was provided to the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) by SECOM on 21 April 1982.

2. In order to assist SECOM in considering the request, enclosed is reference a., and accompanying narrative information on MITRE.

3. Based on available information, DIA recommends SECOM:

a. Approve request for waiver of NOCONTRACT and PROPIN requirements of DCID 1/7 (i.e., that C3I Division, MITRE Corporation be authorized access to NOCONTRACT and PROPIN without permission of the originator).

b. Give matter priority discussion at its 23 February 1983 meeting for an expeditious response.

4. Request [] DIA Office of Security, extension 695-9531, be contacted if additional information is desired.

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FOR THE DIRECTOR:

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1 Enclosure a/s



Colonel, USA
Chief, Office of Security

cc: DUSD C3I (less enclosure)

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SECURITY COMMITTEE
COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

10 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman, DCI Security Committee

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SUBJECT: Waiver of DCID 1/7 Controls for Contractors

REFERENCES: A. Your Memorandum (SECOM-D-067), 18 Mar 83.
B. Your Memorandum (SECON-D-082), 11 Apr 83.

1. References tasked the Compartmentation Subcommittee with reviewing general policy for waiving DCID 1/7 controls on release of intelligence to contractors and to recommend any needed changes to the draft revised DCID 1/7 in the light of a DIA recommendation to afford the MITRE Corporation access to intelligence marked NOCONTRACT and PROPIN without approval of the originator on a case-by-case basis.

2. The Compartmentation Subcommittee considered this matter at its 26 April 1983 meeting and unanimously voted to recommend no change to this aspect of DCID 1/7 thus requiring that cases, such as the DIA nomination of the MITRE Corporation, be considered by the Security Committee on a case-by-case basis. Rationale on this decision was that non-GOCO requests represent a significant departure from the norm and thus require an individual SECOM determination based on the merits of the case.

3. The Department of Energy member, Mr Ritchie, proposed a change to paragraph 6c, DCID 1/7, concerning use of the NOCONTRACT control marking.

a. His proposed change basically would prohibit use of the NOCONTRACT marking except when usage would prevent a competitive advantage.

b. The Subcommittee unanimously rejected this proposal on the basis that adoption would thus eliminate the extant provision allowing use of the marking on information provided by a source with the express or implied condition that it not be made available to contractors. Mr Ritchie noted that the Department of Energy may reclama this issue at the next SECOM meeting.

4. [] noted a problem with usage of the PROPIN control marking and suggested that the Subcommittee consider revision of either paragraph 6d or paragraph 3 of the Appendix.

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a. [] noted that the latter specifically prohibits release of intelligence marked as PROPIN to contractors unless special permission is obtained from the originator. However, the former is vague on this point.

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b. Except for the Department of Justice member who abstained, the Subcommittee unanimously agreed to make no change to paragraph 3 of the Appendix but change paragraph 6d to read as shown in attachment 1.

5. [] also proposed to change paragraph 4, Appendix, of the extant version of the draft revision of DCID 1/7 concerning the contracting out of security support services. The proposed change was noted to be consistent with DDCI Memo, 19 Aug 83, to the Director, OMB, and (except as explained below) is as shown in attachment 2.

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a. The Chairman directed that members contact their principals on acceptance of the above change and advise the Executive Secretary of their vote by 3 May 1983.

b. The DIA member later recommended two changes to [] draft paragraph. The two changes are explained below and have been included in attachment 2.

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Line 6 above: Changed "security" to "support."

Line 11 above: Inserted "these" between "out" and "services."

c. All members, less the DOE member, subsequently advised of their acceptance of the revision to paragraph 4, as amended by the DIA member. The DOE member reported that his principal had some objections which he intended to present to the SECOT at its next meeting.

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[]
GEORGE J. MERZURO, Colonel, USAF
Chairman, DCI Security Committee
Compartmentation Subcommittee

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

23 May 1983

1. Increasing concern at senior levels about the frequency and severity of unauthorized disclosures, and the provisions of NSDD-84, show the need for the Intelligence Community to reflect in its security policies the personal consequences of unauthorized disclosures damaging to the National Security. One step that can be taken immediately is for SECOM to modify DCID 1/14 standards to specify the consequences to one's SCI access eligibility of specific, unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Accordingly, it is recommended that a new paragraph 21 be added to the draft revision of DCID 1/14, to read:

"21. Security Violations. Individuals determined to have disclosed specific classified information to any person not holding a valid security clearance from a United States Government Department of Agency, or not otherwise officially authorized access to classified information, should be considered ineligible for SCI access. If such individuals hold SCI access, they should be immediately debriefed and their access should be terminated for cause. The termination shall be made a matter of record in the Community-wide, Computer-assisted, Compartmentation Control System."

Additionally, it is recommended that a new sentence be added to the end of the last section of Annex A to the draft revision of DCID 1/14 to read:

"Individuals responsible for disclosing specific classified information to any person not holding a valid security clearance from a United States Government Department or Agency, or not otherwise officially authorized access to classified information, are ineligible for initial or continued SCI access."

2. Numerous public references to cheating by college students shows the need for investigations to capture data useful for assessing intellectual honesty. An effective method of doing so would be to obtain academic records on grade point averages and results of achievement/aptitude tests. Accordingly, SECOM should consider modifying paragraph 11.g of the draft revision of DCID 1/14 to read:

"Verify graduation or attendance, and obtain the individual's recorded grade point average and results of scholastic aptitude or other tests designed to determine scholastic ability/achievement, at all institutions of higher learning within the past fifteen (15) years. If the individual did not attend an institution of higher learning, verify graduation or attendance at last secondary school within the past ten (10) years."

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